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Abstract 
Most philosophical engagements with science have been 
focused on the methods of science, epistemological 
concerns, nature of scientific methods or natural laws.  
New disciplines such as Science Studies and History of 
science have emerged from these inquiries and address 
any concerns on the relationship of science to society and 
knowledge. In this essay, the attempt is to clarify how 
scientific thought is not excluded from the moral domain. 
While a scientific fact itself cannot be subjected to moral 
or aesthetic judgement, since it is only, the aims and 
objects of scientific research can be a concern for 
philosophical ethics. Particularly the development of 
applied sciences that are focused on the exploitation of 
the natural world and unsustainable practices must 
become not only subject to moral supervision but also 
must be answerable to society and humanitarian interests. 
An analysis of the purpose of science and philosophy 
posits what should be the areas of science that should be 
subject to ethical judgements.  
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1. Introduction 
When articulated simply, the aims and objectives of science are the 
same as what scientists ‘do’. A better way to understand science is 
to define the function of scientific knowledge; Science is factual 
information and this factual knowledge is supposed to explain 
nature and its processes from a naturalistic perspective as opposed 
to a supernatural perspective. The idea is also to posit that the 
‘truth’ of scientific fact is to be the criteria of judging ‘good science’ 
and science that is corrupted by unethical practices of the scientists 
cannot be good science at all.  So, a cursory survey of scholarship 
related to ethics and science is about the integrity of science or the 
professional ethics of doing science, the robustness of research 
design, the rigours of a scientific method — all of which are 
concerned with proper research ethics, or in case of medical 
sciences, concerned with bio-ethics. 
So, within the domain of disciplines that are called natural sciences, 
moral and aesthetic judgment do not apply to science. The critique 
of gender or unequal representation of certain castes or 
communities in scientific institutions do not concern the discipline 
of science itself but concern the politics of scientific policy and 
social factors that are considered exterior to the results of science.   
In his book What is Science, Sarukkai (2012, pp. 23-24) suggests that 
science has a unique perspective of looking at nature and two main 
presuppositions that help it observe and catalogue nature. He 
points out that first, for science nature is uniform and has certain 
stability that allows prediction and a search for universal laws.  The 
second presupposition of science is that science has no agency of its 
own. It is also inanimate and mute and sterile to our investigations. 
To observe nature, Sarukkai (2012, p. 24) suggests that humans 
must consider themselves outside of it. These ideas of nature are 
essential to the very existence of science itself, he claims.  




These ideas about science seem to be inherited from a time of 
history when science was in its nascent state as a part of human 
endeavour. Carolyn Merchant (2005, p. 61) points out the dominant 
mechanistic paradigm of science has resulted in the death of 
nature: 
The mechanistic worldview continues today as the 
legitimating ideology of industrial capitalism and its inherent 
ethic of the domination of nature. Mechanistic thinking and 
industrial capitalism lie at the root of many of the 
environmental problems.  
It is clear from scholarly discussions that since science explains 
facts about the world around us, it is sometimes referred to as a 
kind of “objective knowledge,” as it does not take on other 
perspectives of judgment such as aesthetic or moral which are 
believed to be subjective and not factual.  The work of philosophy 
on the other hand is this precise area that science excludes. 
Philosophy is a discipline that works in thinking about the moral 
and aesthetic dimensions of activities.  So rather than looking at 
philosophy as a discipline that is opposed to science or something 
that is an archaic form of scientific thinking, one should take the 
position that philosophy and science are complementary in the 
kinds of descriptions they produce about the world. The criteria for 
good philosophy and good science would be the same while the 
kind of knowledge they produce would not be the same, rather, 
they must not be the same.  So, it can be posited that while both 
science and philosophy attempt to seek truths about the world, the 
one primary difference is that Philosophy is free to do what science 
excludes from its domain of explanations that is, to have opinions 
about knowledge and its production.  
2. Aims of Science 
The main concepts that one could analyse include ethical 
perspectives about the aims of science and the domains of 
knowledge of science and philosophy in the contemporary world.  
Using the method of conceptual analysis, one could explore the 
questions science has been asking since its growth in the last few 





centuries. Three questions are interesting to examine within the 
context of the philosophical qualities of science and its study of 
nature. These queries do not pertain to the differences in the 
ontological or metaphysical question of what nature is but instead 
examines the aims of science and methods of science. In other 
words, the evaluation is about not what science studies in nature 
but about how science studies nature, and as a subject that attempts 
to seek the truth, we can ask ‘is science ethically true to its 
purpose’. Is science factual enough, is it ‘good science’? 
To begin the query, one must ask what is the purpose of science? Is 
it a pursuit of happiness or pursuit of knowledge? If it is 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, then why a particular type of 
knowledge? These are questions that people must answer for 
themselves when they’re doing anything. One might ask why 
someone wants to earn money in the stock market rather than 
working in a regular job. Or ask why a student prefers to study 
philosophy rather than psychology?  
 So, when one asks “why do we do science?” it is a bad question. 
One cannot simply ask these questions of the existence of 
disciplines. But one can ask why is science doing the things it does 
that are not aligned with the purpose of science? In this regard, one 
can posit that there are two kinds of purposiveness to doing 
science. 
One could say the first aim of science is the pursuit of knowledge 
about nature. A scientist claims this is a domain of factual 
knowledge about nature and its workings and how these processes 
in nature take place. And science is to determine what kind of 
things are present in nature and around us, and how they interact 
with each other. This factual method is subjected to the methods of 
scientific falsifiability, experimentation, scientific explanation, and 
so on. A strict community of peers is established to make sure the 
knowledge is accurate, updated and always moved towards better 
and valid explanations. The second reason may be considered not a 
true aim of science, but often in the real world, this explanation is 
given as a reason for doing science. Science makes advances in 
knowledge which help society. Scientific knowledge can lead to the 




progress of humankind through technical advances and medical 
benefits. 
While there is no particular reason that science should benefit 
humankind beyond the advancement of knowledge, there is 
always a hidden agenda that seems to imply that science is not just 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake. The discourse of science in 
society is that science is useful knowledge, even the facts about the 
temperatures at which water boils or freezes allow us to sterilize 
baby feeding bottles or make ice cubes for our drinks. The author 
remembers looking at the pressure cooker and thinking “Boyle’s 
law, Boyle’s law” after a lecture on volume, pressure, and 
temperature. 
It is, however important to move away from these basic simple 
scientific facts as the ideal representation of scientific knowledge, 
these facts that are now very much older discoveries, though these 
are still taught as foundations and concepts in school. Particularly 
after most of the basic scientific facts about the world of nature 
have been investigated, the scientific knowledge that is produced 
today is no longer about simple explanations. These facts are 
altered, subjected to factors of change and a long series of 
information is gathered that tests as many scenarios as possible. 
This knowledge of how things work in nature is applied to invent 
things and contribute to society in many ways. Though it is the job 
of technology to make these discoveries of science tenable and 
usable in the real world, one cannot deny that the importance of the 
origins and foundational principles of these discoveries are in the 
field of natural sciences even before they impact something in the 
world.  Faraday discovered induction as early as 1831,i but it was 
only in the early 20 century that this heat itself was posited as a 
useful way for melting steel or heating substances. 
It seems to be somewhat true that the primary purpose of scientific 
knowledge and fact seeking need not be ethically questioned. One 
cannot make an ethical opinion about the discovery of the 
induction itself or the tracking of the orbit of a new planet. If all 
knowledge was judged from its utilitarian value very few human 
endeavours will pass the test of usefulness.  





However, the second dimension of scientific knowledge would 
become important in the questions of human lifestyle, comfort, 
efficiency that are linked to the pursuit of human happiness all of 
which come under the domain of moral philosophy. 
Sayer (2011) claims that “A deeper form of ethical reflection 
involves the contestation of dominant cultural values and 
institutions. Particularly in complex, divided and plural societies, 
different conceptions of virtues and the nature of the good life vie 
with one another” (p. 172). 
The idea is not to discuss the personal happiness of a scientist who 
is discovering facts of nature but to highlight the collective 
happiness of humankind on the whole - a ‘social pursuit of 
happiness’ for human society that has become important to discuss 
in the modern world.  This means that whenever science is used for 
a collective purpose, not just satisfying the curiosity of a scientist, it 
must come under ethical scrutiny. 
People have also questioned these projects of science in terms of 
not the actual purposiveness but sometimes the questions asked of 
these projects are based on economic factors. Is it possible for one 
to invest huge amounts of money in these factual questions when 
there are other humanitarian requirements for the resources? 
For instance, a question could be asked ‘why clone’? One could 
enquire if genetic engineering should focus on a project to clone a 
whole human being? On the other hand, is it different when we 
research how to clone a pancreas for a diabetic patient? Are there 
ethical gradings of scientific aims possible? Similar questions were 
raised after the use of the atomic bomb and these questions have 
not been resolved both for philosophy and science. This essay does 
not claim to have answers to these questions here but highlights 
that these are some of the things that philosophers and scientists 
must think about together. 
3. Nature and Science 
Merchant (2005) points out that the scientific project works through 
the domination of nature: 




Both order and power are integral components of the 
mechanical view of nature. Both the need for a new social and 
intellectual order and new values of human and machine 
power, combined with older intellectual traditions, went into 
the restructuring of reality around the metaphor of the 
machine. The new metaphor reintegrated the disparate 
elements of the self, society, and the cosmos torn asunder by 
the Protestant Reformation, the rise of commercial capitalism, 
and the early discoveries of the new science. 
The questions about the paradigms of science itself, its disregard 
for nature as an important part of humankind’s wellbeing and 
flourishing becomes imperative to foreground as a problematic. 
By now it is possible to start seeing where ethics can benefit 
scientific endeavours. However, it remains to answer the question 
of the ethics of the relationship between science and its object of 
study, Nature.  
Therefore, the idea of nature and the impact it has on the aims and 
objectives of science could also be a good subject matter for 
philosophy, the presuppositions of the science of nature as stable 
and malleable, to study and methods of science that find the further 
extension in the application of its knowledge, sometimes called 
applied science can be philosophically questioned. One must 
remember here that moral questions about the facts of science are 
not being asked here but the reason why those questions are asked 
as opposed to other questions is significant. Said with a simple 
example, one is not asking for the ethical judgement of the boiling 
point or freezing point of water, but asking why scientists are 
interested in the boiling or freezing point of water say instead of 
studying what exactly makes the taste of water different for people 
in different water bodies. Both these topics are studied but the 
questions of the first kind are more emphasized and more 
“factual.” Biology would be interested in the second question, so 
sometimes it is called a soft science, this division indicating that 
there seems to be a hidden hierarchy of what is more factual and 
less factual.  Which in some sense then is an opinion on scientific 
facts, which ideally are not subject to judgements of values. 





With increasing ecological damage to the environment, one must 
consider that historically science has been directed towards nature 
as a means of controlling nature or taming nature. The facts of 
science allow  the extraction of resources from nature and putting 
these resources into human use.  
Sarukkai (2012, p. 25) points out “… science is not just another 
story, another narrative, about the universe; it is also one that 
establishes control over it.” In other words, he opines that the 
capacity of science to intervene in the natural world is unmatched 
by other disciplines, science manipulates nature. There are 
examples of this intervention everywhere - chemical processes to 
produce new forms of compounds that resulted in the invention of 
plastics. Understanding Hydrocarbons resulted in the proliferation 
of the petroleum industry. Advances in agricultural sciences and 
understanding the processes in growing plants has led to 
widespread development of agriculture in places that agriculture 
was not possible. Development of cash crops and other soil 
technologies also have focused on maximizing benefit and 
minimising input. 
All this sounds amazing until one looks back at the devastation to 
the natural world and nonhuman nature that has been caused. It is 
unfair to say that science is responsible for the destruction of the 
environment. But one can say that science has been so focused on 
observing nature for exploitation and its manipulation that it has 
not paid attention to those studies which may benefit the 
preservation and conservation of the natural world. I am not saying 
no scientists are working on nature, but most of science functions 
from this earlier presupposition.  
Biological sciences, particularly ecologists and sustainability 
scientists have taken on the lonesome task of restoring nature. The 
rest of the scientific community be it physics, or technology prefers 
a hands-off approach towards the restoration of the environment. 
This is perhaps because some scientists believethemselves to be of 
the world but not in it. 
This the superstition of science, one that seems to see knowledge as 
unembedded in the world that produces it.  Science is and has been 




concerned historically with relating to nature in a particular way. 
This has always been a relationship of dominance where science 
puts nature to use, the knowledge produced by science is used to 
prepare nature for human use. This utilitarian perspective of 
science has been critiqued by ecofeminist and environmental 
philosophers. This is the domain of science that should be subjected 
to the moral compass by both philosophy and social sciences. It is 
the need for these disciplines to challenge science to change the 
way it relates to nature. Disciplines such as Biological sciences 
followed by medicine have been one of the first few disciplines to 
bring in ethics of research, particularly because the intervention of 
scientific methods of study of sentient beings and life is most 
visible as dangerous.  
4. Conclusion 
Therefore the question must not be one of ‘understanding’ for the 
utilisation of nature, but the utilisation of science for nature. 
Science must begin to serve nature and its preservation, not the 
other way around. Nature has served as a sterile object of scientific 
research, a passive recipient of manipulation. If science does not 
correct this balance soon ,we as humans will find ourselves without 
a habitable environment. And one cannot also eat scientific facts; 
however true they may be.  If science honours facts and truth, it is 
important for scientists to also admit the truth about its aims and 
function in society.  
The ethical questions which arise when applied science collides 
with traditional belief systems such as religion or cultural 
traditions is one of the issues that arises because science places 
itself apart from the society that sustains and cohabits it. For 
instance, using an animal protein within a rice plant to increase 
vitamin A in the grain may seem like  a very good nutritional 
solution, on the other hand, many strict vegans and vegetarians 
such as the Jains may feel very uncomfortable with this scientific 
advancement. That is because ethical perspectives are also given 
from within some of these social religious frameworks of 
communities. 





When questions of such moral responsibility arise, the ethical 
domain must uniquely enter the domain of science. Numerous 
questions such as — what kind of knowledge must be sought? Is 
the seeking of facts about certain things in the world dangerous? 
Who should control these facts? Are the scientific facts public 
knowledge or are they to be maintained by the people who funded 
the research? Can the scientific facts be used for secretive control or 
political blackmail by either withholding or disseminating 
information? Is scientific knowledge public? If yes, then should the 
production, dissemination, and sharing of that knowledge be 
regulated by democratic processes? These are issues that should be 
addressed by both the scientist and the people who benefit from 
science. 
The image of a lonely male scientist in a lab working on great 
discoveries continues to be a stereotype in these disciplines. The 
scientific hero has replaced the religious icon. When the actual 
source for production of scientific knowledge is searched for, it is 
found that science is done in institutions, in clusters of 
communities, and scientific knowledge is funded by governments 
and corporates. The science itself is considered universal 
knowledge for the good of humanity, the control of scientific 
knowledge is mired in social economic and political structures of 
society. Thus, it can be seen that increased economic benefits are 
interfering in the true pursuit of scientific knowledge. It is well 
known that designing for obsolescence is a common practice in the 
development of new technologies. 
On the other hand, certain kinds of basic science research have little 
credibility while more beneficial and charismatic science is given 
priority. Charismatic science can create scientific myths and 
showcase science as a useful and magical enterprise to the general 
public. Much like the scientific shows of the early 19 century, these 
charismatic scientific discoveries are not innocent. This kind of 
propaganda may benefit a few instances for funding,  but the 
unbalanced development of scientific studies is likely to harm the 
true and ethical purpose of science and the benefits for human 
society in the long run. It is perhaps much more exciting to talk and 
write about the glamour of walking on the surface of the moon or 




searching for water in distant planets and do the science required 
for it rather than work on a nutritive potato resistant to drought for 
those dying of hunger. It is more economically beneficial to invest 
in developing new forms of plastic then working out the science to 
clean up our air and water. This lopsided pursuit of science is not 
the fault of science as a discipline but of the socio-economic 
circumstances that have crept into the domain of scientific 
knowledge production. It is therefore important for us as 
philosophers to ask of science those ethical and moral questions 
which have not been asked strongly. At the same time, it is also 
important for us to support the pursuit of truth as the common 
aims of both philosophy and science. One must urge for a coming 
of a value-driven science, whose aims take into account the state of 
the planet and its people today. Knowledge generated that 
addresses the survival of humanity itself, not socio-economic 
welfare would be the need of the hour. Science can be useful, but to 
whom and where this use is employed must be the concern of 




I am extremely grateful to Dr Sundar Sarukkai for some of the 
perspectives his ideas have provided for me in this subject. Many 
ideas presented here are the result of his reflections and our 
conversations on the same. This paper is a post- reflection on his 
views on the nature of Science and Society. 
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i  Induction heating is the process of heating an electrically conducting object 
(usually a metal) by electromagnetic induction, through heat generated in the 
object by eddy currents.   
